Repatriated to “Prison”: Landgrabbing as a tool of segregation in Myanmar by Nagakoshi, Yuzuki
Repatriated to “Prison”
Landgrabbing as a tool of segregation in Myanmar
Yuzuki Nagakoshi 2019-09-24T09:00:28
The Rohingya, a religious and ethnic minority in Myanmar, have been systematically
persecuted and discriminated against for decades. The government and the military
(“Tatmadaw”) enforced various measures against the Rohingya, such as forced
labor, denial of education and basic healthcare, and extreme restriction on traveling,
and have made parts of Rakhine State an “open-air prison” for many Rohingya.
The Tatmadaw’s repeated rounds of gruesome violence against them significantly
exacerbated the situation – most recently in 2017, when the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights called the government’s actions “a textbook example of ethnic
cleansing”. The UN-mandated Independent International Fact-Finding Mission
concluded that the scale and brutality of the conduct and surrounding policies
circumstances may be sufficient to find “genocidal intent” of the perpetrators. Due
to these repeated mass-atrocities, approximately one million Rohingya have sought
refuge in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.
The Myanmar and Bangladeshi governments agreed on a plan to start voluntary
repatriation to Myanmar in mid-August. In late July, the Myanmar government held
talks with the refugees in Cox’s Bazar to explain repatriation plans, but the refugees
feel left out of the discussion and are skeptical about their safety and their prospects
of getting full rights at citizens upon returning. On the day of the repatriation, not a
single refugee volunteered to return. The refugees’ worries are well-founded. Behind
the international repatriation discussions and explanatory sessions in Cox’s Bazar,
the Tatmadaw and the civilian government have been conducting mass-scale land
grabs, taking advantage of the Tatmadaw’s destruction of Rohingya villages during
and after the 2017 violence and the resulting absence of the Rohingya residents in
many parts of Rakhine State.
Remaking Rakhine
The land is being reallocated to the security forces, government facilities, and
housing for non-Rohingya. Some of the land is occupied by poorly-built transit camps
and relocation camps for returning refugees, but a majority of the newly-built houses
are not for the Rohingya, according to one report. Even undamaged houses have
been demolished, and some Rohingya villagers have been evicted to make space
for a Border Guard Police Base. The government maintains that its intention is to
merely to rebuild conflict-torn Rakhine State, but the actual use of land shows that
they are “remaking Rakhine State” by expropriating land from the Rohingya.
The leaflet distributed to the refugees in Bangladesh by Myanmar government
authorities did not provide any policies as to where the Rohingya should build
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their livelihood upon repatriation. The landless and homeless Rohingya may be
indefinitely confined to transit centers
The civilian government has claimed that it will use national law to seize the
Rohingya’s land that were burned down by the Tatmadaw and local vigilantes. The
mass-arson was followed by the government’s demolition of Rohingya villages,
leaving the Rohingya without any hope for return, both because of the re-allocation
of the land and extreme difficulty of proving that they legally resided there before
evacuating.
According to the Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, the
Natural Disaster Management Law (“NDM Law”)  provided the legal basis for the
demolitions. The NDM Law authorizes the government to confiscate and redevelop
burnt land, irrespective of its previous status and regardless whether the cause of
the fire was natural or man-made. Under the Law, Rohingya citizens who return to
their homeland could be directed to leave the “areas and buildings at risk” (Section
9(i)(l)) and may even be incarcerated if they enter areas or buildings affected by the
disaster without permission (Section 30(b)).
The government’s application of the NDM Law to the land burnt by the military
during the operations violates its international obligations. Applying the Law to
the current situation, in which the Tatmadaw burned the land, would result in a
manifestly absurd result – the government can legitimately confiscate land through
arbitrarily burning land. As the Special Rapporteur stated in her report submitted
to the Human Rights Council, such interpretation is incompatible with Myanmar’s
obligation as a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which requires that the government recognizes “the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food . . .
and housing” (Art. 11(1)). It is also inconsistent with Myanmar’s support for the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right to
own property and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property (Art. 17).
Regardless of whether the mass-land grab was an intended consequence of the
genocidal violence or exploitation of an opportunity created by it, the Rohingya have
the right to claim their land and livelihood and homes back. One of the fundamental
principles of Myanmar’s National Land Use Policy (2016) is the government’s
recognition and protection of legitimate land tenure rights of ethnic minorities,
including the Rohingya (Section 8(a)). If the government claims that the expropriation
was for a public purpose, they should, as a minimum, afford the Rohingya all the
procedures provided under the old Land Acquisition Act (1894) and its revision (The
Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Law, 2019).
 The “largest land grab in Myanmar’s history”
In addition to the ongoing “redevelopment” conducted under the NDM Law, the land
grab conducted under the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law (“VFV
Law,” 2012) and its 2018 revision are further endangering the Rohingya’s rights to
ancestral land in “what could be the largest land grab in Myanmar’s history.”
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Around 30% of Myanmar’s total land area is “vacant,” “fallow,” or “virgin” according
to the law, 82% of which is located in ethnic minority states.  The VFV law applies to
42% of Rakhine State. The government may reallocate such to domestic and foreign
investors and landless and smallholder farmers (VFV Law (2018) Section 4; 5; 5-
a). The problematic 2018 revision of the Law requires the residents and farmers of
“vacant” or “fallow” land to apply for a 30-year permission for continued land use
(Section 11; 11-a; 22). Applying for permission would mean that the original right
holders to the land would accept government ownership and control over the land.
Their customary entitlement to use the land for an indefinite period would be lost.
However, by refusing to register, residents and farmers would risk incurring fines or
even imprisonment. (Section 27; 27-a).
Upon expiration of the 6-month grace period to apply for the permission (Section
22(b)(1)) in March 2019, unregistered land could be expropriated by the government
(Section 22(b)(2)). According to a survey conducted a month before the expiration
of the grace period, 58% of farmers residing in various states and regions in
Myanmar were unaware of the law. Moreover, few respondents knew of the
registration deadline. Land grabs for undocumented land and criminal prosecution
for “trespassers” under the VFV law have already taken place.
The process was unduly prejudicial against ethnic minorities, many of whom do not
read or write Burmese. For the Rohingya, the situation has been worse due to them
being mostly illiterate. Participating in the registration process either at the local
or central authorities has been impossible for the refugees. Gathering necessary
documents supporting their title to the land is an undue hardship for the Rohingya,
who had to constantly relocate in fear of violence.
Women were further prejudiced against because of their lower literacy rate
compared to men. Considering that around 14% of the refugee households in Cox’s
Bazar are led by single mothers (as of November 2017), women’s participation in
the process is also crucial to secure the livelihood for many families. Moreover,
although the Law does not apply to “customary land” (Section 30-a(b)), the law does
not state the criteria under which the land will be categorized or how ethnic minority
communities can apply for such exception. Few people know that such exceptions
exist, making them vulnerable to investors who exploit the farmers’ lack of access to
legal aid.
Foreign Investment: Fuel for Land Grabs, High Risk for Investors
Foreign investors’ appetite for land in the resource-rich and geopolitically important
Rakhine State is enormous. Unfortunately, economic development has historically
fueled land grabs in Myanmar. Some suggest that economic interest was behind
the violence against the Rohingya. Facts support such speculation: The upsurge in
violence since 2012 were accompanied by its opening up to foreign investment, and
there was a drastic increase in land reallocation to corporations in predominantly
Rohingya areas in 2017. International investment has also supported the clearance
operations through financing the military: Fourteen foreign companies have joint
ventures with Tatmadaw-related businesses, and some companies even provided
donations to the Tatmadaw amidst the widely-reported genocidal attacks of 2017.
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Investment in Rakhine State does not only contribute and encourage human
rights violations but also might subject the investor to unforeseeable risk under
Myanmar contract law. There are high risks associated to investment involving
illegally acquired land. Contracts involving use of unlawfully acquired land might be
void under Section 23 of the Myanmar Contract Act, which provides that contracts
with unlawful objects or considerations are void. Objects or considerations that
are immoral, opposed to public policy, or involve or imply injury to the person or
property of another is considered unlawful. Expropriation of land is allowed under the
government’s current interpretation of the NDM Law, but such reading is untenable.
It is difficult to predict what would happen, if and when the government corrects its
interpretation of the Law.
Foreign investors might also be left without the right to seek compensation for
losses or restitution of benefits conferred against the government or military or any
Myanmar counterparty to the void contract. Section 56 of the Contract Act provides
that a party is not entitled to damages if they knew or should have known that the
counterparty did not have the legal right to grant rights to use the land. Investors
also might not be able to obtain restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act,
depending on its interpretation. An Oxford treatise on Myanmar contract law argues
that restitutions should not be allowed for contracts that are void due to illegality,
although the statute does not provide for such exceptions.
Despite reports of land grabs and other illegal and discriminatory land acquisition
practices, some governments are supporting their companies’ efforts to invest
in Rakhine State. The Rakhine State Government and Myanmar Investment
Commission, together with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has jointly organized the
Rakhine State Investment Fair in February 2019. The two Japanese governmental
organizations provided a large part of the funding. Five hundred business people,
mainly from Asian countries such as China, India, Japan, Korea, and Thailand, as
well as some UN officials and diplomats participated in the fair.
Rakhine State needs economic development, as Aung San Suu Kyi stated in one of
her speeches, and international investment might serve that goal. However, mass-
violence against the Rohingya and subsequent land grabs are not only unethical
and illegal but also unsustainable in the long run, unless the government succeeds
in preventing their repatriation or indefinitely confining them to domestic camps.
Investing in Rakhine State as it stands would only fuel violence and exacerbate the
conflict.
International pressure required
Preventing land grabs is not only important to protect the Rohingya’s right to
inherited land, but also to prevent their indefinite confinement in government-run
centers and camps. Such segregation of the Rohingya would strengthen and solidify
Myanmar’s apartheid regime and renders them even more vulnerable against
targeted attacks and uncontrolled violence. Prior to repatriation, the Rohingya must
be given credible reassurances by the government and the Tatmadaw that they will
be able to return to their homeland or at least be provided adequate remuneration
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and afforded an opportunity to relocate freely. Such reassurances must be backed
by international support and pressure for compliance.
It is unlikely that the Myanmar government or the Tatmadaw will change course
on its own initiative, but it might do so with sufficient international pressure. One
way to put pressure is to withhold investment: Because some foreign investors are
refraining from investing in Myanmar to avoid contributing to or being associated
with human rights abuses, the Myanmar government badly needs investment for
economic development. Another way is through international prosecution. Forced
deportation in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the
Rohingya population may violate Article 7(1)(d) of Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (2002). Some argue that the ICC may be able to bring genocide
charges although Myanmar is not a member state of the ICC. The Court is currently
conducting a preliminary examination on the situation, and the Prosecutor requested
permission to open a formal investigation in July this year.
The international community thus has leverage over Myanmar if the countries and
the enterprises can cooperate in exuding pressure on the government. Repatriation
should not result in the Rohingya being indefinitely trapped in a “prison” because of
their ethnicity and faith. It is now time to end support to the apartheid regime and
show solidarity with the world’s most persecuted ethnic minority.
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